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The discovery of a small cosmological constant has stimulated interest in the measure problem.
One should expect to be a typical observer, but defining such a thing is difficult in the vastness of
an eternally inflating universe. We propose that a crucial prerequisite is understanding why one
should exist as an observer at all. We assume that the Physical Church Turing Thesis is correct
and therefore all observers (and everything else that exists) can be described as different types of
information. We then argue that the observers collectively form the largest class of information
(where, in analogy with the Faddeev Popov procedure, we only count over “gauge invariant” forms
of information). The statistical predominance of the observers is due to their ability to selectively
absorb other forms of information from many different sources. In particular, it is the combinatorics
that arise from this selection process which leads us to equate the observer class O with the nontrivial
power set Pˆ(U) of the set of all information U . Observers themselves are thus the typical form of
information. If correct, this proposal simplifies the measure problem, and leads to dramatic long
term predictions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The detection of ongoing cosmological acceleration was
one of the most interesting discoveries in recent years
[1],[2]. The form of the acceleration (with w close to −1)
leads to the conclusion that it is probably due to a small
cosmological constant Λ [3],[4],[5]. Einstein’s “biggest
blunder” has turned out not to be a blunder at all.
In a further amusing twist some explanations for the
source of this Λ involve arguments about typical ob-
servers within a vast multiverse. A large amount of fine
tuning is needed to reduce Λ from its natural value of
M4P , and this fine tuning winds up at a number very
close to the anthropic bound, confirming Weinberg’s pre-
diction [6]. Furthermore string theory provides a wide
enough landscape of states to generate such a small Λ
[7–10], and eternal inflation gives a method to populate
them [11],[12]. These anthropic arguments [13–17] thus
reintroduce the somewhat unusual subject matter of ob-
servers in physics, some 80 years after the discovery of
modern quantum mechanics in the late 1920s.
Indeed, one should expect to exist as a “typical ob-
server”: one shouldn’t see 50σ events or macroscopic vi-
olations of the 2nd law and so forth. This is a reflection
of the statistical nature of our universe, and practically
speaking it is implicitly assumed in all scientific disci-
plines. The issue of what constitutes a typical observer
becomes somewhat nontrivial however when considering
the immense volumes of spacetime generated in cosmol-
ogy.
For instance, upon making some initially reasonable-
sounding assumptions one could come to the conclusion
that we exist in the earliest civilization possible after the
big bang (the youngness paradox [18],[19]), or that the
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typical observer is a Boltzmann Brain (i.e. a disembodied
brain floating in the void [20],[21]). Trying to fix these
bizarre results composes the measure problem: how to
define probabilities in the infinite volumes generated by
eternal inflation [22–37]. A proposed measure solution
will posit some form of cutoff, so that only a finite num-
ber of observers are considered, with the statistical distri-
bution of their experiences (very broadly speaking) thus
well defined. There are measures that just consider the
observations made along a single world line, and others
that sample from entire spacetime volumes. The hope
is that with the correct choice of measure the standard,
non-exotic experiences of observers within our Hubble
volume will be found to be typical within the entire mul-
tiverse, although this is still an open question.
There is a very deep and interesting assumption behind
all of these ideas, one which is generally not questioned.
As noted, one should expect to exist as a typical observer.
However, why should one expect to exist as an observer
at all? This is a nonintuitive subject matter (and it is
something that is quite easy to take for granted), so it is
helpful to take some time and rephrase the question in a
number of different ways.
It is important to first clarify: what are observers? We
staunchly support the materialist viewpoint and posit
that the brain/mind connection is complete: all of one’s
conscious experiences as an observer are generated by the
interactions of neurons in one’s brain (see e.g. [38],[39],
[40],[41]). In turn, observers exist due to natural selec-
tion: being able to extract pertinent information from
one’s environment is a very useful evolutionary adapta-
tion.
To give a more detailed example, consider an individ-
ual having breakfast in the morning. At one moment in
time they will experience a particular mixture of sights
and sounds – the sunlight coming through the window,
the coffee brewing – perhaps while having a thought
about the upcoming day or remembering something from
2the previous one, and all of this is permeated by an emo-
tional milieu and a sense of self in the background. All of
these aspects of consciousness are equal to the patterns
created by the subset of neurons that are active in the
individual’s brain at that moment in time.
To transition to a more abstract description, the ex-
periences of that individual are a particular type of pat-
tern: a form of topological connected graph, as realized
by the connections of the currently interacting neurons.
The precise structure of the pattern (and thus the nature
of the conscious experiences) will change from moment
to moment, based on the dynamics of the neural bio-
physics and the details of the incoming sensory informa-
tion. There is a large amount of self-similarity however in
the structure of the individual’s neural patterns as they
evolve in time, and indeed there is substantial similar-
ity between different people’s conscious states (e.g. we
can talk to each other). Collectively all of these types
of patterns form a class of mental states. To rephrase
the typical observer assumption, one expects to exist as
an element of this class, where each member is a type of
pattern formed out of an arrangement of atoms.
Further abstraction is possible and is useful. The key
is that observers are just a particular type of information,
as is everything else. That is, we assume that the Physi-
cal Church Turing Thesis (PCTT) is correct [42],[43],[44],
and the universe can be simulated to arbitrary precision
inside a sufficiently powerful computer (e.g. in a univer-
sal Turing machine T ). This confidence is based both on
the wide range of individual scientific successes to date,
and the impressive way in which they overlap to form a
unified whole. By calculating of all of the interactions
among the constituent particles in a simulation S of a
large region of the universe, one could thereby reproduce
stellar evolution and the formation of planets, the emer-
gence of replicating molecular structures, and after a long
period of Darwinian evolution the arrival of complex life
forms which can observe and understand their environ-
ment.
If all of the details in the history of events inside a
particular simulation Si happen to match the evolution
within our Hubble volume, then the observers within that
simulation would be indistinguishable from us: the pat-
terns generated by their simulated neurons would pre-
cisely match the patterns formed in our brains. At the
same time, and at the deep level of the hardware gen-
erating the simulation, those observers are just another
type of information: complex sequences of 1s and 0s that
evolve according to the implemented algorithm. Every-
thing else in that simulation, or in any other running
program, is also just information – different sequences of
binary data.
Describing everything that exists in terms vast num-
bers of logical operations is admittedly a strident form
of reductionism, and is of little practical use in most
day to day activities, scientific or otherwise. One pri-
mary purpose of this gedankenexperiment is to help shake
off the natural tendency to take existing as an observer
for granted: those observers in the giant simulation are
completely equivalent to the information encoded in se-
quences of 1s and 0s (as is everything else that exists).
What is the special property of the observer-sequences so
that one should exist as one of them, rather than some
other form of information?
Before proposing an answer, let us first examine the
nature of information in a bit more detail. Note that
the precise form of the various sequences of 1s and 0s is
not necessarily critical. For instance, a Turing machine
T1 running the simulation Si can itself be emulated by a
second universal Turing machine T2. The various objects
inside the simulation Si (say, comets and seagulls and
picnics and so forth) will be encoded in different binary
sequences in T1 and T2, but the real information content
of these objects does not change.
There is thus a degree of redundancy possible when
describing objects in a computational framework (or any
other framework). Consider the set A given by the union
of the output of all possible programs. A can be gener-
ated by acting on all finite length binary strings si with
a universal Turing machine T :
A =
⋃
T (si). (1)
There will then be an equivalence class [Si] in A for all
of the programs that encode the same history of events
described by Si:
[Si] = {Sj ∈ A|Si ∼ Sj}. (2)
More broadly, the elements of A can be partitioned into
the “information structure” blocks [xi]:
A / ∼en= {[xi]|xi ∈ A} (3)
where we use the special equivalence relation ∼en which
has the abstract definition: “encodes the same informa-
tion”. For instance, in addition to detecting and grouping
together all the programs that give rise to the simula-
tion Si, this equivalence relation will also group together
the data streams of the programs that give a proof of
the Pythagorean theorem, or describe the life cycle of a
species of fern, and so forth. We will later discuss the
feasibility of explicitly constructing such a general equiv-
alence relation.
Alternatively, a particular binary representation xa1
for some information structure xa encoded on T1 amounts
effectively to a gauge choice for the description of that
structure – similar to choosing a coordinate system gab
to map a spacetime manifold M. Furthermore, we will
argue, in an analogy with the Faddeev Popov proce-
dure ([45],[46]), that it is useful to get rid of the redun-
dant gauge descriptions when counting among various
forms of information. We will therefore borrow the term
“gauge” (in a slight abuse of the term) to describe the
various representations that are possible for any informa-
tion structure. We are primarily interested in the trans-
lationally invariant information xa, with various gauge
choices G(xa) being more or less helpful in describing it.
3We have assumed that the PCTT is correct, and thus
everything that exists can be represented as various types
of information xi (for convenience we will drop the brack-
ets from [xi]). We will name the union of all these struc-
tures the universe of all information U :
U =
⋃
xi = A / ∼en . (4)
U resembles the von Neumann universe V of set the-
ory (which is a proper class [47]), or Tegmark’s Level 4
Multiverse [48],[49]. We adopt a Platonic viewpoint and
assume that the entirety of U actually exists. U thus con-
tains mathematical structures like x3p = {3 ∈ P} (where
P are the primes), xeul = {eipi+1 = 0}, the Pythagorean
theorem xpt, the Mandelbrot set xms, the wave equation
xwe and so on.
U also contains very complex structures like our phys-
ical universe, which we will denote by Ψ (i.e. Ψ ⊂ U).
Through objects like Ψ the universal set will also contain
all of the complex emergent phenomena that can arise
through the interactions of many particles, such as vol-
canos xvol, grasshoppers xgh, constitutional monarchies
xcm, and sensory qualia xsq. These emergent structures
are somewhat statistical in nature, as defining them will
involve some degree of coarse graining over microscopic
degrees of freedom.
Observers are included among these complex struc-
tures, and we will grant them the special name yj (al-
though they are also another variety of information struc-
ture xi). For instance a young child yc1 may know about
x3p and xgh: x3p, xgh ∈ yc1, while having not yet learned
about xeul or xcm. This is the key feature of the ob-
servers that we will utilize: the yj are entities that can
absorb various xi from different regions of U .
We can now rephrase our central question in its final
form. Consider the Universal Set U : the set of all forms of
information. All of the observers yj will collectively form
a particular subset of the Universal Set: the Observer
Class O:
O =
⋃
yj . (5)
It is a given that to exist at all entails existing as some
form of information – to be some element within U . Why
is it that one exists as an element of the Observer Class
O in particular? This question is shown pictorially in
Fig. 1, where the different forms of information are sym-
bolically represented as various strings of 1s and 0s (i.e.
some computational gauge has been chosen).
The Observer Class Hypothesis (OCH) proposes a sta-
tistical answer: observers form by far the largest subset
of U :
|O| ≫ |U − O| (6)
and thus a element chosen randomly from the universal
set is overwhelmingly likely be an observer (i.e. Fig. 1 is
not drawn to scale). Just as typical observers dominate
the counting among all observers, observers themselves
dominate the counting among all forms of information.
The Universal Set
Class
The Observer
110110001...
10011100...
1010111...
0010110...
1000011...
00101010...
011101100...
110011010...
100100111...
011010... 0100111...
FIG. 1: The Observer class as a subset of the Universal Set
(represented in some computational gauge).
The observers form the most numerous class of infor-
mation due to their primary trait: they can observe other
forms of information, and thus incorporate them as sub-
sets of themselves. For N different pieces of information
xi in U , there will generally be 2N different possible ob-
servers yj who absorb anywhere from 0 to all N of the
xi. The observers thus collectively resemble the power
set P(U) of the set of all information, and indeed we will
later propose specifically that they effectively form the
nontrivial power set Pˆ(U):
O ∼ Pˆ(U). (7)
Note also that observers can observe other observers (and
so on recursively) and so for example P(P(U)) ⊂ O. We
therefore refer to O as a class (i.e. a proper class) rather
than a set. In summation it is the combinatorial potential
of the observers which leads them to vastly outnumber all
other types of information, and thus provide the general
form that existence invariably takes.
II. GAUGES AND COUNTING
The core idea of the Observer Class Hypothesis is that
if one counts over all forms of information they will find
that observers greatly outnumber all other structures.
However, the counting process seems to be problematic
at first for a number of reasons. For example, there is
the issue of over-counting pieces of information that have
merely been re-expressed in a different form. It would
also appear that completely random structures in fact
dominate the counting instead of observers. These issues
are solvable, which can be demonstrated through an ex-
amination of gauge choice (i.e. the selection of some for-
malism to represent different types of information). The
concept of gauge invariance then leads to a more precise
definition of information, and influences the considera-
4tion of the number of different forms of information that
exist.
We first examine the gauge redundancy that exists in
the representation of all forms of information. Consider
as an example the small element xa1 inside of U : xa1 =
{3 ∈ P}, where P are the prime numbers. This simple
mathematical factoid xa can be re-expressed in an infinite
number of different ways: xa2 = {1 + 2 ∈ P}, xa3 =
{√9 ∈ P}, and so on (i.e. xa1, xa2, xa3 ∈ G(xa)). The
proposal thus appears to be plagued by infinities, as even
one simple mathematical statement would get counted an
infinite number of times.
This over counting problem is not limited to the math-
ematical equivalence class. To pick a literary example,
one can take a famous quote from Hamlet, and arbitrar-
ily translate it into the “1-q” language: “qto qbe qor
qnot qto qbe”, or into the “2-q” language and so forth.
In general this form of vacuous translational redundancy
exists for all information structures. This can be seen
in the example we noted before, where a simulation Si
running on the Turing machine T1 can be emulated by
a second universal Turing machine T2. The history of
events within Si won’t change, but the sequence of 1s
and 0s describing it in T2 does.
It also appears at first that the universe U is in fact
dominated by random noise. If we continue with the com-
putational framework and consider the elements of U to
be binary strings, then there are 2N different strings si
that are N bits long. The vast majority of these 2N
strings are completely random, and do not encode any
real gauge-invariant information. This is reflected, for
instance, in the fact that the Kolmogorov complexity
K(si) [50],[51] of an average string si is comparable to
the length of si:
K(si) ∼ |si| (8)
We will denote a true random string (i.e. it has no
internal patterns or real structure) by ri. This is distinct
from the Kolmogorov definition of randomness, which
equates being incompressible with being random. Most
of the incompressible si strings are indeed patternless
ri strings, but a nontrivial fraction will instead be the
most compact representations of real information struc-
tures (e.g. consider the most compact binary description
of the Einstein equations xEE versus a random string ri
of the same length).
We propose that both of these problems – over-
counting due to gauge redundancies and the apparent
numerical dominance of the random noise structures –
can be solved by choosing a gauge. Consider a similar
problem that arises in quantum field theory due to gauge
fields. A straightforward evaluation of the path integral
Z:
Z =
∫
DAe
i
~
∫
L(A,∂A)d4x (9)
for a gauge field Aµ gives an infinite result since the
Lagrangian L is invariant under gauge transformations
Aµ → A′µ = Aµ + ∂µφ. Faddeev and Popov give us a
solution: separate out the redundant gauge portion of
the Lagrangian and integrate it separately as an irrele-
vant infinite constant. Colloquially speaking, we get the
correct answer if we only consider the physical variations
of Aµ, and not the redundant gauge variations G(Aµ).
We posit that the same thing is true when counting
over all forms of information: we need to count over
only the real, distinct information structures (such as
xa1 = {3 ∈ P}), and ignore the redundant translations
(such as xa2 = {2 + 1 ∈ P} and so forth) which would
lead to an infinite over-counting. The particular repre-
sentation formalism chosen to describe the different types
of information is not important here, as only its ability
to remove the extraneous redefinitions is needed.
We also postulate that the selection of a representation
gauge removes all of the random noise structures ri which
appear at first to dominate the counting in U . In short,
the random structures are all gauge translations of noth-
ing at all. Consider for instance the quote from Hamlet,
which we can arbitrarily translate into the “318-q” lan-
guage, which makes the quote much longer but doesn’t
add any real information to it. In the same fashion, a
very long (and internally structureless) random sequence
ri is nothing more than the ri translation of the null set
Ø:
ri ∈ G(Ø) (10)
The intuitive feeling that random structures don’t con-
tain any real, nontrivial information is indeed correct,
and a manifestation of this is that they do not carry any
gauge-invariant information (see also [52],[53]).
In contrast, non-trivial forms of information contain
internal patterns and structures that map unambigu-
ously from representation to representation: a child will
learn that a mouse is a type of mammal in an English,
French, or Chinese biology book. In comparison, one is
free to translate a book-length random sequence ri into
any other random sequence they wish, as it does not have
any internal structures that must be preserved. We thus
conclude that the true information content of the book
I(sbio) is much larger than the information content of a
random string of the same length : I(sbio) ≫ I(ri) ∼ 0.
This is opposed to the result one gets from the Kol-
mogorov measure, where IK(sbio) < IK(ri) since the bi-
ology book will be compressible to a degree, while the
random sequence ri is not. Focusing on the gauge in-
variant information is therefore equal to selecting objects
that have nontrivial “effective complexity” [54] or a large
amount of “logical depth” [55],[56]. As the random and
redundant elements are removed by the selection of a
gauge, we can then use the Kolmogorov measure to de-
scribe the complexity of the various xi (e.g. IK(sbio) for
the biology book). There will then be many more xi
with large values for IK than those with a small amount
of complexity, and thus a randomly chosen information
structure will likely be very complex.
We have described the real, non-trivial information
5structures as having gauge invariant internal patterns,
but have not given an explicit characterization of this
property. To this end one imagines a finite length al-
gorithm F that can search through all 2N of the N bit
strings si (for any N) and extract and organize all of the
gauge invariant information structures xi, with the re-
mainder being the gauge translations of those structures
G(xi), or the random strings ri = G(Ø). For instance F
would be able to examine the strings sp = {3 ∈ P} and
sq = {4 ∈ P}, and select sp to be filed among the xi,
while discarding sq, or determine that the effective com-
plexity of a frog is much greater than a glass of water of
the same mass.
As a concrete example, consider the simple world of
binary addition ψBA, which is composed of strings of 4
symbols: 0,1,+,=. In general it is possible to have correct
strings: “1+1=10”, incorrect strings: “1+0=11”, and ill-
formed strings: “+1+==”. For this toy model one can
construct an algorithm FBA that will search through all
4N of theN symbol strings and extract the fraction which
are correct. A numerical implementation of FBA shows
that the number of correct strings scales approximately
as ∼ 0.17 × 2.53N . This is the type of behavior that
we expect in the general case: the number of real struc-
tures will grow exponentially (via combinatorics) as the
string length N increases, but at a slower rate than the
total number of strings. The xi will thus form a sparse
subset of the strings si, with a density trending towards
zero as N → ∞. On a side note, we do not conclude
that there is an infinite amount of real information in
ψBA, even though there are correct strings of unbounded
length. Rather, the amount of nontrivial information in
ψBA is comparable to the length of the algorithm FBA:
I(ψBA) ∼ |FBA|.
One can construct these types of algorithms for var-
ious simple problems, but it is not possible to con-
struct a finite length algorithm F for the general case, as
demonstrated by Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems [57],
and Church and Turing’s negative answer to Hilbert’s
Entscheidungsproblem [58],[59]. This itself is not a prob-
lem, but rather a reflection of the natural structure of U .
Just as random strings ri can’t be compressed, the union
of real information structures (4) can not be completely
encapsulated by any finite length description. Ignoring
categorization, there is not even a universal trait that
all of the individual xi carry which a “litmus test” type
F could test for: no single equation in Wiles’ papers
proves Fermat’s Last Theorem, no single chemical bond
in a chlorophyll molecule shows that photosynthesis is a
useful evolutionary adaptation. One needs essentially a
library (or the internet) to give a zeroth order approx-
imation of F for merely the things we have learned so
far in our corner of Ψ. The best one can do for a concise
measure of information content is thus something like the
Kolmogorov measure, which works due to the pigeonhole
principle, but is necessarily silent on the semantic content
of the various binary strings.
Explicitly constructing a finite algorithm F that sifts
through all binary strings si and extracts all of the xi
which compose U is not possible, but in the end it isn’t
needed either. To make an analogy, Ψ does not actu-
ally physically perform a Faddeev Popov type procedure
to remove the redundant gauge degrees of freedom every
time two gluons interact (which alternative formulations
like BRST show). Alternatively, all of the various pro-
grams T (si) in A will either halt or not, there just isn’t
a finite length algorithm that can determine which is the
case in general. Likewise, U simply has a natural, intrin-
sic structure, which the consideration of gauge invariance
merely helps to highlight. This natural structure is clear-
est in the case of the mathematical xi: it really is the case
that 3 is a prime number and 4 is not (see also [60],[61]).
Just because we consider the union of all xi, it is em-
phatically not the case that “anything goes”.
The existence of this natural structure also carries over
to the complex emergent phenomena that can arise in
physical universes like Ψ. For instance, a salamander
(xsal) is a nontrivial information structure which occurs
in our universe. One consequence of being a real xi is that
salamanders exist much more frequently in our Hubble
volume than a direct counting of all the permutations
Ω of the same number of atoms would suggest. In fact,
we will later use a high frequency of occurrence f(xi) as
an indicator that an emergent object xi has nontrivial
structure.
The intricacy of these complex emergent phenomena
can be seen if we further prod our example structure
xsal: that is, what do we mean precisely by a salaman-
der? A certain individual organism at one moment in
time? Do we coarse grain over the orientations of the
water molecules in that individual’s cells? What about
the particulars of the ongoing gene expression in those
cells at that moment in time? Do we instead consider
all the individuals in a breeding population at a moment
in time, or the general features of their shared genotype
and phenotype over a broader span? Furthermore there
has been a nearly continuous evolution (being discrete
at the parent-child level) from the most basic replicating
molecular structures early in the Earth’s history to the
various species that exist today (see, e.g. [62]) – where
does one make a cutoff?
Naturally, there is no single right answer, as different
definitions and levels of detail illuminate different aspects
of the information structure which we concisely named
xsal. While very complex and inextricably interwoven
with many other objects (and local to the branch of Ψ
we find ourselves in), xsal is also not arbitrary or ran-
dom: it is an example of a natural structure occurring in
U , not unlike the mathematical structures xa = {3 ∈ P}
or xb = {eipi + 1 = 0}. Note, however, that in fact all
possible arrangements of atoms will occur with at least
some non-zero frequency inside an eternally inflating Ψ.
Just existing as a pattern somewhere within a physical
universe like Ψ is thus too imprecise of a measure for
membership in U . Rather, we generally want the pat-
terns that occur frequently in Ψ to be promoted to the
6xi elements of U – those patterns that minimize the La-
grangian in (9), roughly speaking.
In fact, there is a natural solution for selectively rank-
ing the various complex patterns and phenomena that
can arise in a universe like Ψ: do not consider the pat-
terns in perfect isolation (like pure mathematical fac-
toids), but rather as the emergent structures embedded
in a physical universe that they are. The frequency f at
which a particular pattern occurs in Ψ (which is closely
linked to the process that generates it) thus becomes a
useful tool in measuring its information content. For in-
stance, all sorts of bizarre objects (say, interplanetary
china teapots: xict) can be formed in an eternally inflat-
ing Ψ through macroscopic quantum tunneling events.
As these objects are formed through abrupt random pro-
cesses they contain little gauge-invariant information,
and this in turn is linked to their exponentially small
production rates (which also corresponds to having very
little logical depth [55]). In short, they can be quickly
and concisely described as very improbable random fluc-
tuations, and thus for example: I(xsal)≫ I(xict).
Note that the frequency at which a particular pattern
xa occurs (which is a function of xa’s internal structure)
is only one component of its information content – there
is also the actual complexity ∼ IK(xa) of the pattern
(at an appropriately coarse-grained level). The gauge
invariant information contained in a pattern xa will thus
roughly scale as the complexity of the pattern times the
frequency of its occurrence:
I(xa) ∝ IK(xa)× f(xa). (11)
IK(xa) is the baseline Kolmogorov complexity of the pat-
tern, and a large value for f(xa) then makes it likely that
the value of IK(xa) stems from nontrivial effective com-
plexity rather than random noise (e.g. the compact de-
scription of the Einstein equations xEE will have a large
value for f as compared to a vanishing value for a random
sequence ri of the same length).
In fact, it would generally suffice for our purposes to
define f to be a step function, so that it equals 1 for those
patterns that have a greater than 50 percent chance of
occurring within a Hubble volume over the 100 billion
years of standard stellar evolution, and zero otherwise.
In this way f does the work of F and effectively extracts
the sparse subset of nontrivial structures from among
the exponentially large set of possibilities. For instance,
if we coarse grain biological patterns at the cellular level
(with, say, 100 different cell types, each with an average
mass of 10−9 grams), then there are ∼ 1001014 different
possible arrangements for a 100 kilogram “organism”. In
a similar fashion to the simple binary addition example
ψBA, the number of viable organisms (i.e. f = 1) will
grow exponentially with increasing mass, but at a much
slower rate than the total number of arrangements (i.e
most permutations have f = 0).
A step function profile for f is admittedly artificial –
in reality f will be a function of the internal structure of
the various patterns (and the environment in which they
occur). In general, there is a smooth continuum from
exceptionally unlikely to commonplace phenomena, and
thus there is no clean cutoff such that we could include
the more common objects to be among the real informa-
tion structures xi while discarding the rest as random
ri. Indeed, evolution via natural selection, lacking goals
or foresight, must sift through many different patterns
(of varying degrees of randomness) in a process of itera-
tive trial and error in order to generate nontrivial emer-
gent structures such as xsal. Likewise, even with goals
and foresight, iterative trial and error is an indispens-
able component of scientific discovery – as observed for
instance by Poincare´. We are thus not calling for the
elimination all aspects of randomness, but rather merely
positing that the apparent preponderance of the com-
pletely random ri in U was always an illusion.
By including the frequency at which various complex
emergent phenomena occur as a useful indicator of their
information content we essentially rediscover the mea-
sure problem. Within the confines of our Hubble volume
things are clear cut: spontaneous violations of the 2nd
law are very rare (say, a glass of water separating out
into ice and steam), and thus have a very low informa-
tion content. In the expanse of an infinite universe how-
ever, even these very rare events can occur an infinite
number of times, and the counting thus becomes trick-
ier. It would seem that with a countably infinite number
of both the “rare” and “common” events that one is free
to arrange and count them in any fashion and thus arrive
at any relative frequency. A common example of this is
to ask what fraction of the integers are even. A natural
guess is 1/2: {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, . . .}, but they can be rear-
ranged to give any fraction between zero and one – say
1/3: {1, 3, 2, 5, 7, 4, . . .}.
In response to this we ask a related question: what
fraction of the integers are prime? The same trick can
be played here, with the primes and composites being
rearranged to give any desired fraction. However, if we
make the restriction of considering all integers less than
N , and then letting N go to infinity, then there is a non-
trivial answer: the number of primes pi(N) less than or
equal to N is approximately equal to N/ ln(N) (or, more
closely, Li(N) =
∫ N
2
dt/ ln(t)). If the Riemann hypoth-
esis is correct we can even add the order of magnitude
error estimate: pi(N) = Li(N)+O(
√
N ln(N)). Just ask-
ing what fraction of the integers are prime is thus an
incomplete question. The question is uniquely finished
by adding the constraint (or regularization) of consider-
ing all integers less than N (and then letting N → ∞).
Furthermore, the correctness of this particular question
can then be seen by the abundance of natural structure
(the Prime Number Theorem xpnt, and the associated
properties of the Riemann Zeta function) that it leads
to.
We assert that the same scheme holds for physical uni-
verses like Ψ: they can be infinite in extent and still
contain nonrandom, nontrivial structure (which can be
revealed by asking the right questions). Agricultural so-
7cieties, for instance, will occur much more frequently in Ψ
type universes than teapots spontaneously formed in pro-
toplanetary disks. This is certainly the case within the
confines of our Hubble volume, and the puzzle is to then
find the correct regularization or measure that extends
this general pattern of relative frequencies to arbitrarily
larger volumes. Note that it is not the case that the rel-
ative frequencies in distant regions will be identical to
those we observe locally – but rather it should emerge
that our Hubble volume is typical among the subset of
regions that support complex life. This problem is a good
bit more subtle than the case of regulating the integers,
and we will not offer our own measure proposal here. We
will also refrain from endorsing other measure proposals,
although we think there are interesting candidates that
may be on the right track.
Our primary goal is even broader in scope than re-
covering the general distribution of probabilities within
a physical universe like Ψ. We claim that it is not only
the case that the xsal type objects greatly outnumber
the random xict objects in a Ψ type universe (i.e. we as-
sume that a correct regularization which confirms one’s
intuition is possible), but that the xsal outnumber the
xict throughout the entirety of U (and therefore the non-
random structures dominate the information content of
U).
To give a possible counterexample to this proposal,
there will be “heat bath” type universes ψHB within
U , such that all of their internal patterns are generated
through random fluctuations. In these ψHB universes the
xsal and xict type structures will be produced at com-
parable rates. Since no consistent patterns emerge, the
interactions that occur within a spacetime volume of one
of these ψHB universes can effectively be compressed to
the initial state and evolution equations that then evolve
it. Ψ on the other hand starts with a very low initial en-
tropy (instead of a maximal entropy like the ψHB), and
will thus preferentially generate certain complex emer-
gent patterns (the “viable ones”) as the entropy increases
(and these emergent structures are not described by the
initial conditions and evolution equations, other than in
some “latent” sense). The heat bath universes are thus
effectively the analogue of the long random strings ri:
they appear very complex at first, but they carry lit-
tle real information – essentially only that carried in
their evolution equations. The information content I(Ψ)
within the Ψ type universes is thus vastly greater than
the random ψHB type universes: I(Ψ)≫ I(ψHB).
In addition to the completely disjoint ψHB type uni-
verses existing elsewhere within U , it is possible that
our own universe could evolve into an eternal heat bath
phase. This would be the case, for instance, if the
current acceleration is due to a true cosmological con-
stant Λ, so that we will eventually transition to an eter-
nal de Sitter universe, with a horizon temperature of:
TdS =
√
2GρΛ/3pi. A straightforward counting of all
of the observers yj in this scenario would seem to be
dominated by the infinite number of Boltzmann Brain
observers yBB in the cold de Sitter phase. In turn this
is sometimes presented as evidence that Λ must not sta-
ble and will decay at some point in the future. There
are independent reasons to be skeptical of an eternal de
Sitter phase [63], and we are not proposing that our uni-
verse has a true, immutable Λ. However, we do not think
the possibility of an infinite number of yBB rules a true
Λ out: the real information is contained in the initial,
stellar evolution phase of Ψ.
Finally, one can also conjecture the existence of other
types of physical universes (i.e. Ψ−1) where the internal
dynamics (during an entropy increasing phase) specifi-
cally leads to the bizarre objects like the interplanetary
teapots consistently outnumbering the natural objects
like salamanders. If these universes were to exist, then
upon counting over both the Ψ and Ψ−1 one could find
that all possible patterns are produced at comparable
rates. Here we simply assert, given the inherent struc-
ture of U and the deep mathematics that provide the
foundation of Ψ, that these Ψ−1 type universes do not
exist – just as the statements {eipi + 1 = 4}, or “the
Mandelbrot algorithm produces an isosceles triangle” do
not correspond to xi in U . The nonrandom emergent
patterns that arise in nontrivial mathematical structures
like Ψ are therefore also the primary content of U itself.
In summation, the universe of all information is full of
nontrivial mathematical structures and complex emer-
gent phenomena – i.e. the sorts of things that observers
are interested in absorbing. Indeed, it is because to
this ability to selectively extract information from other
sources that observers themselves form the vast majority
of U .
III. OBSERVERS
The Observer Class Hypothesis proposes that the ob-
servers yj collectively form the largest subset of the uni-
verse of all information U . In particular, the way in which
the observers selectively absorb xi from various regions of
U (say, xa, xb, xd, ... ∈ yα;xa, xc, xe, ... ∈ yβ ; ...), results
in the observer class resembling the power set P(U). We
will refine this observation, and propose specifically that
observers effectively form the nontrivial power set of U .
The “non-triviality” restriction for the elements of P(U)
then naturally leads to physically realized observers ex-
isting within a superstructure like Ψ. We then consider
the overall size of U , including the possibility that it is in-
finite in extent. If I(U) = ℵ0, then universal observers yˆj
may be able to absorb any xi by continuously upgrading
their ability to process information.
Consider first the straightforward power set P(X ) of
some set of information X = ⋃Ni=1 xi ⊂ U . The amount
of information in X can be found by summing the infor-
mation content of its members:
I(X ) =
N∑
i=1
IK(xi) (12)
8(where one can use the Kolmogorov measure IK as the
alternative gauge versions G(xi) and random strings ri
have already been cut from U). What then is the infor-
mation content of P(X )? Each element xa ∈ X will occur
in half of the 2N elements of P(X ), so a direct counting
would give Idir(P(X )) = 2N−1I(X ). This is a very ineffi-
cient description however – the entire content of I(P(X ))
is in fact contained in the combination of the original set,
and in the definition of the power set, so that the true
information content is: I(P(X )) = I(X ) + I(P) ∼ I(X ).
However, it is also possible to combine basic infor-
mation structures and form a new, nontrivial structures
through their interconnections. For instance, various as-
pects of Riemannian geometry (x ∈ XRiem) were used in
the derivation of the Einstein equations of general rela-
tivity, or in Penrose and Hawking’s singularity theorems,
and in Perelman’s proof of the Poincare´ conjecture. Dif-
ferent combinations of proteins (x ∈ Xprot) allow assorted
bacteria to live in environments ranging from the root
systems of fig trees, to the shores of alpine lakes or in
thermal vents on the sea floor. Alternatively, various ar-
rangements of electrical components (x ∈ Xelec) allow for
the creation of radios, radars and integrated circuits.
We therefore define the nontrivial power set Pˆ(X ), to
be the sparse subset of combinations from X that lead to
new structures in U :
Pˆ(X ) = P(X )
⋂
U . (13)
There are a couple caveats in this definition. In general
the repetition of simple elements in X is allowed (e.g.
many transistors are needed for a computer chip). Addi-
tionally the elements of X may need a system of tags so
that the interconnections within the new structures can
be explicitly identified (say, the locations of the circuit
elements on the computer chip). The straightforward
power set of some set X (of N elements) does not add
any new information, but the selection of the nontrivial
combinations does:
I(X ) ∼ I(P(X ))≪ I(Pˆ(X )). (14)
The elements of Pˆ(X ) − X are new xi elements of U
(which observers can also absorb).
Consider then the proposed observer yr1 (i.e. a direct
element of P(U)): yr1 = {xtang, x3, xnept}, where xtang
is a tangerine, x3 is the number 3, and xnept is the planet
Neptune. This random collection of various information
structures from U is clearly not an observer, or any other
from of nontrivial information: yr1 is redundant to its
three elements, and would thus be cut by the selection
of a gauge. This is the sense in which most of the direct
elements of the power set of U do not add any new real
information.
However, one could have a real observer yα whose main
interests happened to include types of fruit, the integers,
and the planets of the solar system and so forth. The
3 elements of yr1 exist as a simple list, with no over-
arching structure actually uniting them. A physically
realized computer, with some finite amount of memory
and a capacity to receive input, resolves this by provid-
ing a unified architecture for the nontrivial embedding of
various forms of information. A physical computer thus
provides the glue to combine, say, xtang, x3, and xnept
and form a new nontrivial structure in U .
It is possible to also consider the existence of “ran-
domly organized computers” which indiscriminately em-
bed arbitrary elements of U – these too would conform to
no real xi. This leads to the specification of “physically
realized” computers, as the restrictions that arise from
existing within a mathematical structure like Ψ results
in computers that process information in nontrivial ways.
Furthermore, a structure like Ψ allows for these physical
computers to spontaneously arise as it evolves forward
from an initial state of low entropy. Namely it is pos-
sible for replicating molecular structures to emerge, and
Darwinian evolution can then drive to them to higher lev-
els of complexity as they compete for limited resources.
A fundamental type of evolutionary adaptation then be-
comes possible: the ability to extract pertinent informa-
tion from one’s environment so that it can be acted upon
to one’s advantage. The requirement that one extracts
useful information is thus one of the key constraints that
has guided the evolution of the sensory organs and ner-
vous systems of the species in the animal kingdom.
This evolutionary process has reached its current
apogee with our species, as our brains are capable of
extracting information not just from our immediate sur-
roundings, but also from more abstract sources such as
XRiem, Xprot, or Xelec. We can absorb the thoughts of
others on wide ranging subjects, from Socrates’ ethics,
to Newton’s System of the World. Observers can also
create structure, from individual works like van Gogh’s
paintings, to collective entities like the global financial
system. The combinatorics that arise from the expansive
scope of sources that Homo Sapiens can extract informa-
tion from thus explains why we are currently the typical
observers.
We have hypothesized that observers comprise the
largest class of information, but the implications that
follow from this depend on the size of U itself. In general
there are three possibilities for the extent of the universe
of all information:
• U is finite: I(U) < N (for some finite N),
• U is countably infinite: I(U) = ℵ0,
• U is uncountably infinite: I(U) > ℵ0.
Roughly speaking, U could be “small”, “big”, or “very
big”. It could be argued that the first case is the null
assumption, but we will also seriously examine the pos-
sibility that I(U) = ℵ0 (which follows if there is no fi-
nite upper bound to the complexity of real information
structures). However, we will not inspect in depth the
I(U) > ℵ0 case (which would necessitate xi that are ir-
reducibly infinitely complex). It is conceivable that the
third case could be meaningful if hypercomputers of some
9form could be built, but we find this scenario unlikely.
We note in passing that if was the case that I(U) > ℵ0,
then it may be possible to demonstrate (6) via cardinality
arguments.
First consider the case that U is finite. One begins
with an infinite number of programs producing data in
A, but the action of removing both the redundant trans-
lations and the random output significantly prunes the
binary tree. It is possible that after this gauge cut only
a finite number of finitely complex structures xi remain,
so that the sum of all their information content is also
a finite number. Note that this is possible since we use
compact representations for the various xi. For instance,
one could go through and list all of the prime integers,
thereby generating an infinite number of true statements,
but the existence of an infinite number of primes is con-
cisely expressed in Euclid’s proof. Likewise, a single un-
computable real requires an infinitely long description,
but the general procedure to generate reals can be con-
cisely defined by Dedekind cuts (therefore most real num-
bers are effectively infinitely long ri sequences). In this
sense there may only be a finite number of unique math-
ematical structures, encapsulated in some Xmath, so that
no combinations from P(Xmath) lead to new, nontrivial
structures.
Furthermore, if I(U) < N , then our physical universe
Ψ only contains a finite amount of real information. Ψ
could still be infinite in spatial extent, perhaps due to
a form of eternal inflation. However, in this scenario,
the dynamics of Ψ would only allow finitely complex ob-
jects to arise in any one region. For instance, the deep-
est dynamics of Ψ may be completely described by some
finitely complex mathematical structure (perhaps a com-
pletion of string theory). These fundamental dynamical
laws may only admit a finite number of degrees of free-
dom in any finite volume of spacetime (in agreement with
current Planck scale/Holography proposals [64],[65],[66]).
The construction of arbitrarily complex structures would
then necessitate coherent communication across arbitrar-
ily large scales. If it is the case that I(U) < N , then un-
bounded communication of this sort is not possible. Ad-
ditionally, if U is finite, then necessarily there are not ar-
bitrarily more complex alternative universes ψ elsewhere
in U – the complexity of the structures within our Ψ
would be representative for the finite number of other
physical universes in U .
If the Observer Class Hypothesis is correct and U is
finite, then in principle a direct counting would show
|O| ≫ |U − O|. In practical terms there would be phys-
ical observers yj with the memory capacity to absorb
a large number of the most complex xi in U – com-
binatorics would then ensure that the observers domi-
nate the counting. The number of xi structures with a
Kolmogorov complexity of N bits should then roughly
look like a rescaled and truncated Poisson distribution
f(N ;λ), with the observers yj composing the majority
of the central bulk (and with a typical observer describ-
able by ∼ λ bits).
This is the “small” case for U , with a finite upper
bound for the complexity IK of all gauge invariant in-
formation structures when expressed in a compact repre-
sentation (although this “small” case still corresponds to
a very rich and intricate universe of information). If this
is the nature of U then presumably as typical nontrivial
observers we should already be asymptotically approach-
ing everything that can be known. Of course, it is also
possible for U to be finite but for the OCH to be incor-
rect. For instance there could be a very large Z ⊂ U such
that all of the elements of Z are much too complex to be
absorbed by any physical observer (and thus |Z| ≫ |O|).
In this case there must be some special property pos-
sessed by the observers, other than being very numerous,
so that one should exist as an observer, rather than be
an element of Z (note that we still assume the PCTT
and thus everything that exists is some form of informa-
tion). Note that as we do happen to be observers we are
effectively “trapped”: we can only point to the possible
existence of a vast Z. Any progress towards explicating
its various structures would drive Z to being a subset of
O. In general we will make the simplifying assumption
that these enormous and “forever inaccessible” Z sets do
not exist.
It would be interesting if I(U) < N , but the alternative
is even more intriguing: it may well be that U is com-
posed of an infinite number of distinct, finitely complex
xi. We view Go¨del’s Incompleteness result (paraphrased
as “No finite system of axioms and inference rules cap-
tures all mathematical truths”), and Turing’s halting re-
sult (“no finite algorithm can capture the behavior of
all programs”) as suggestive that I(U) = ℵ0. Likewise,
the probable result from computational complexity that
P 6= NP (and the associated complexity class hierarchy
[67]) is also suggestive that there are nontrivial objects
of unbounded complexity in U . However, we do not in-
terpret these results as definitive proof that U is infinite.
For instance, repeatedly applying Go¨del’s result to gener-
ate new independent axioms doesn’t actually lead to new
structure, and the unpredictability of most programsmay
be due their being effectively random in structure.
If the OCH is correct, and I(U) = ℵ0, then the status
of observers is more subtle. As there are xi of unbounded
complexity in U there would need to be arbitrarily com-
plex yj to absorb those structures. If these yj do exist the
counting would need to be regulated by first considering
only xi with a Kolmogorov complexity of less than N
bits, and then letting N → ∞. If the OCH holds, then
the density of the observers |O|/|U| will approach one
as the complexity of structures goes to infinity. In this
way the observers would roughly resemble the composite
integers, with the primes corresponding to the various
information structures that they can absorb.
This proposal appears at first to be incompatible with
our existence as a typical observers. For instance, con-
sider a class Yα ⊂ U which is composed of observers
one thousand times more complex than a Homo Sapiens:
IK(ya) ∼ 103IK(yb), with ya ∈ Yα and yb ∈ YHS . Via
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combinatorics it follows that |Yα| ≫ |YHS | and thus one
should expect to be one of the very advanced Yα instead
of a human. However, this process can be repeated indef-
initely: one should instead expect to be a member of Yβ
whose members are 103 times more complex than those
in Yα and so on. As there is no upper bound, there is no
one level of complexity that one should expect to exist
at – there will always be many more individuals at much
higher levels.
We propose that the resolution for this is that one
should expect to exist as a universal observer yˆ, rather
than existing at any one level of complexity. A univer-
sal observer yˆ has the ability to absorb any information
structure xi from U , and they thus collectively dominate
the counting among all observers (as well as U itself).
However, in order to be nontrivial information structures
we have argued that the observers must be concretely re-
alized computers embedded in some mathematical struc-
ture like Ψ. Being concretely realized, an observer will
have a finite capacity at any one moment in time, and ac-
cordingly there will be an upper bound to the complexity
of objects that they can promptly absorb at that time.
The solution is to not place a time limit for the absorp-
tion of a very complex structure: in general a universal
observer yˆj will need to gradually upgrade their physical
capacity (via scientific and technological progress) for a
long period of time until they have the ability to absorb
an arbitrarily large xi from U . Universal observers are
thus self similar: at any one moment in time they will find
themselves to be more complex than some other individ-
uals, and less complex than a large number of (potential)
observers above them. Note in particular that they are
not structures that exist statically at any one point in
time, but rather are entities that are always evolving in
time. It is because of this capacity for growth that the
universal observers – both concretely realized and contin-
uously evolving – are the typical observers (if I(U) = ℵ0).
This scenario seems to be at odds with our current
experiences: after reaching adulthood the complexity of
what one can learn generally levels off. If this state of
affairs was to persist indefinitely, then one should con-
clude something along the lines of: U is finite and we are
close to saturating what is possible, or: U is infinite in
extent and therefore the OCH is wrong. However, there
is a real chance that this restriction could be lifted in the
coming decades. In particular the development of hu-
man level artificial intelligence (and then beyond) would
open the possibility of unbounded growth. We are not
yet universal observers, but we may be on the boundary
of becoming them.
Admittedly, the plausibility of the development of hu-
man level Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a contentious is-
sue, and there have been promises for its arrival at dates
that have long since come and gone [68]. Still, it can be
argued that computing hardware has now become suf-
ficiently advanced to support strong AI. For instance,
based on analysis of the retina Moravec [69] estimates
the information processing rate of a single neuron to be
on the order 103 flops, which results in an estimate of
1014 flops for the entire brain, which is comparable to
the current largest supercomputers. Likewise there is
steady progress on the software side in a large number of
specialized fronts. To give a concrete example, given the
advances in robotics, natural language processing, and
object recognition, it should now be possible (with suf-
ficient funding) to build a bipedal robot which, if asked,
could find and describe various objects while navigat-
ing its environment. There is still a large distance be-
tween this type of robot and an AI that could, say, be
a good sitcom writer, but this gulf should be bridgeable
by continuous evolutionary improvements. The bridging
might not even take too long: Kurzweil, for instance,
optimistically predicts that strong AI capable of passing
the Turing test could arrive by as early as 2030 [70]. His
predictions are based on a coarse grained extrapolation
of the growth in information technologies, which so far
have followed smooth exponentials for many decades.
In general, most non-dualists would agree that human
level AI is possible in theory, if perhaps disagreeing on a
likely arrival date. Note also that while the emergence of
AI is not assured in any one civilization, that it is effec-
tively guaranteed to occur in some fraction of histories
in an eternally inflating universe. Furthermore, if it is
developed, it would be surprising if it were to then stall
permanently at about our intelligence level (although this
could be evidence that we are already saturating what is
possible in a finite U). It seems more likely that they
would be able keep on progressing, in time processing
thoughts orders of magnitude more complex than we are
capable of now. However, there currently appear to be
limits to the complexity of computers that could con-
ceivably be built, which puts the prospect of unbounded
growth in doubt [71],[72]. As noted, Planck scale and
holographic arguments indicate that a finite number of
degrees of freedom are available for computation in a
finite volume of spacetime, and the construction of ar-
bitrarily large structures would at least be a nontrivial
undertaking.
These apparent roadblocks are not necessarily insur-
mountable. For instance, Dyson [73] argued that life
could persist indefinitely in a flat or open universe (if
in an ever slower, colder form). Krauss and Starkman
disagree [74], pointing out that with a nonzero Λ that
temperatures can not be lowered indefinitely (although
note [63]), and alternatively in a flat or open Λ = 0
universe the amount of matter available to a civilization
would either be finite, or would lead to a collapse into
a black hole. However, they observe that their analysis
does not examine speculative strong quantum gravity ef-
fects (such as [75]) which may allow workarounds to these
restrictions (we also note that true singularities may be
avoided in the interiors of black holes - see e.g. [76],[77]).
Likewise, the apparent restrictions on the number of
degrees of freedom available in a finite volume are not
necessarily inviolable. These restrictions stem from the
current structure of proposed fundamental theories, but
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these may evolve and generalize in the future. To pick
an example, the majority of calculations in string theory
have been done in the critical dimension D = 10, but
non-critical (linear dilaton) theories are also conceivable
[78],[79]. More abstractly, it has always been the case in
the past that the theories we have discovered have been
the limiting cases (e.g. ~→ 0; v/c→ 0) of more complex
theories, and this may apply to string theory (and thus its
implications) as well. Furthermore, if it is possible for an
apparently fundamental theory to be a particular limit
of a yet more complex structure, then statistically this
should turn out to be the case (i.e. there will be many
“deeper structure” variations available in U , as opposed
to only one version where the deepest laws are equal to
those that have already been discovered).
Finally, the development of powerful AI seems possible
within standard atomic physics, and so the subsequent
details in the task of unbounded advancement would fall
to them (assuming they do arrive). Note that a degree
of vagueness in these futuristic predictions is unavoid-
able due to the sparseness of the nontrivial structures
xi among all possible permutations si (compounded by
the likely fact that P 6=NP). Scientific and technological
advancement necessarily involves a large amount of trial
and error because of this sparseness, and is thus both
“hard” and hard to predict. Still, if U is infinite and the
OCH is correct, then in time the AIs will be successful in
finding and utilizing modifications of (or loopholes in) ba-
sic physics in order to continuously compute and absorb
evermore complex information structures, thus becoming
universal observers yˆj .
IV. APPLICATION AND PREDICTIONS
In his “Discourse on the Method” Rene´ Descartes
searched for the securest foundation for philosophical in-
quiry, and converged upon “I think, therefore I am”. We
disagree with his subsequent claims, but the central ob-
servation is quite interesting. The insight can be split
into two parts: “I exist” (or just: “Existence”) and then
“I exist as a thinker”. We assume basic existence (i.e.
that there is something rather than nothing), and ques-
tion the second part: why is it that to exist, to be any-
thing at all, entails existing as a thinker? Why is it that
to be an observer is the particular form that existence
takes?
We have proposed a statistical answer in the OCH.
The first clue emerges from the great unity in the world
that the scientific revolution has revealed in the last 350
years. While many of the details remain to be filled in,
the broad sweep of phenomena that we observe fits neatly
into an overarching explanatory structure, from mathe-
matics and particle physics to atomic physics and chem-
istry, up through microbiology and neurology to con-
sciousness and the evolution of civilization. It is striking
that all of the objects in this expansive range can be fully
described as various types of information (assuming the
physical version of the Church Turing Thesis is correct).
The universal capacity of information for representation
is likewise reflected in the way in which all the elements of
conscious experience (from any type of idea to memories,
emotions, sensory qualia, and the sense of self) are equal
to the different patterns created by interacting neurons.
Following this observation it is natural to postulate a
“grand unification”: everything that exists is a type of in-
formation. The xi can be collected in a U , which removes
gauge redundancies and random strings. The observers
then form a subset of the grand ensemble with the special
property that they selectively extract information from
other sources. If the Observer Class Hypothesis is cor-
rect, the combinatorics that arise from this selection pro-
cess lead to the observers dominating the counting among
all information structures (6). This provides a statistical
explanation for why we find ourselves to be thinkers: it
is by far the most probable form of existence.
We have considered two specializations of the hypothe-
sis: in one version I(U) < N there is a finite upper bound
to the complexity of objects xi (when expressed in a com-
pact representation), and in the other I(U) = ℵ0 there
is no upper bound. The first possibility could be viewed
as the null assumption – currently the complexity of the
universe looks finite. However, we will adopt the more ex-
travagant second version in order to apply the OCH and
make predictions. This is version is at least conceivable:
for instance both Go¨del and Turing’s results are sugges-
tive that there is no upper bound to the complexity of
real information structures. If I(U) = ℵ0 then the OCH
requires the existence of universal observers yˆj which can
absorb any information structure. Being physically real-
ized, they will in general need to upgrade their capacity
for a long period of time before they have the ability
to absorb a particular xi. The universal observers are
thus concretely realized, continuously evolving in time,
and broadly self-similar. The curious fact that strong AI
could be developed in the coming decades is supportive
of the possibility that universal observers could be devel-
oped.
We can now apply the universal observer version of
the OCH to several problems involving typical observers.
We first examine the Doomsday argument due to Carter
[80] and Gott [81]. In the simplified version one consid-
ers 2 possible Future Histories: a “utopia” FH1, and a
“doomsday” version FH2. In FH1 our species perseveres
for a very long time (say ∼ 108 years), so that perhaps
∼ 1016 humans will live at some point. In the alternative
FH2, some terrible event eliminates our species in the
fairly near future (say within the 21st century) so that
the total number of humans that will ever live is com-
parable to the number that have been born so far (i.e.
from 1010 to 1011). Note that we are typical observers in
the doomsday history FH2, but are very special observers
in the FH1 scenario: in the utopian version we live very
close to the beginning of history. If the prior probabilities
for FH1 and FH2 are comparable (a large assumption),
then using Bayesian statistics one would conclude that
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the disastrous FH2 scenario will likely take place.
The conclusion is flipped if we assume that we are uni-
versal observers however. This is because the observa-
tions of yˆj are roughly self similar: at any one moment
in time they can promptly absorb xi of some finite com-
plexity, but at arbitrarily distant points in the future they
will be able to absorb arbitrarily more complex struc-
tures. All universal observers therefore find themselves
to be relatively close to the beginning of history.
We can also address the peculiar Boltzmann Brains
(BBs) which seem to affect the choice of measure in cos-
mology. We argue that the assumptions of I(U) = ℵ0
and universal observers are not needed here: in a finite
U one also should expect to not be a BB, even if they
are generated late in the evolution of Ψ type universes.
The real information content in Ψ is contained in the
early non-equilibrium period where a certain subset of
patterns are produced much more frequently (because
of the details of their internal structure) than a direct
counting of all permutations Ω would indicate. These
nontrivial patterns form the information content of Ψ,
and they are the objects that one could exist as. The
Boltzmann Brains are random fluctuations that happen
to reproduce the patterns that exist in the stellar evolu-
tion phase – they carry no information content indepen-
dent of the nontrivial observers that they copy. If one
could exist as a thermal fluctuation, then one would be
a completely random arrangement, not one of the BBs
which comprise a tiny fraction of the permutation space.
Thermal fluctuations and random structures in general
contain little real information (despite first appearances)
as they can be efficiently encapsulated as trivial ri (i.e.
they have very low effective complexity [54]). Note that if
universal observers are possible then the case against BBs
is further strengthened: one should exist as a constantly
evolving and growing observer, while the BBs cease to
exist only moments after they are formed.
The concept of Boltzmann Brains has recently been
used as a tool in the construction of measures in cos-
mology, and to argue that vacuum energy must decay
on a fairly fast timescale. We in effect argue that this
particular tool is not valid – one should exist as a real,
gauge-invariant information structure, such as the ordi-
nary observers that can emerge after several billion years
of evolution. Anthropic arguments and measure propos-
als may still be useful, but they need to be predicated on
these nontrivial observers. This is the case for instance
in Weinberg’s prediction for the cosmological constant,
or in Dicke [82] and Carter’s [83] explanations of Dirac’s
large number coincidences.
The OCH can also be used to make coarse-grained pre-
dictions about the evolution of minds and civilization go-
ing into the future. Previously we have considered the
possibility of the development of human level AI (and
then beyond) as supportive of the large U version of the
OCH. We switch here and assume I(U) = ℵ0, and thus
the typical observer (and therefore the typical form of
information) is a universal observer yˆj. This then ne-
cessitates the development of strong AI, to be followed
by ceaseless advancement and exploration of ever more
complex xi. Note that the universal observer version of
the OCH probably can not be definitively proven as it
hinges upon the existence of arbitrarily complex nontriv-
ial structures. Rather, in practical terms, the longer that
scientific and technological progress persist the more con-
fidence can be had that it is correct. The current pre-
diction is thus limited to the arrival of strong AI, as the
detailed prospects for subsequent progress would then fall
to them. A precise date for the emergence of strong AI
can not be given, but it is striking that the timescale ap-
pears to be only on the order of decades (which compares
favorably, for instance, to the ∼ 1010 year vacuum decay
predictions).
Finally we emphasize the explanatory power of the Ob-
server Class Hypothesis. It is easy to take existing as an
observer for granted, but upon reflection there should be
something special about minds so that to exist at all is
to exist as one of them. The OCH answers in both ways:
observers are not special as they are just another type
of information, but they are special since their ability
to absorb other forms of information makes them very
numerous. Further consideration points towards only
counting over distinct, gauge-invariant forms of informa-
tion. One thus needs nontrivial observers, and these can
emerge from biological evolution working within the con-
straints imposed by a mathematical structure like Ψ. If
there is no upper bound to the complexity of information
structures, then existing as a entity that is continuously
evolving in time is also natural: this solves the dual con-
straints of being physically realized while making possible
the absorption of any xi. The most common form of in-
formation, and most probable form of existence, is thus
a typical observer who is embedded in a structure like Ψ
and is continuously evolving in time.
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